BOB ALLCOCK: In defence of
Beijing's interpretation
No one doubts that the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress has the power of interpretation -
it is expressly set out in the Basic Law itself. But there has, nevertheless,
been criticism on other grounds.
Some argue that the Standing Committee's
power of interpretation should never be exercised. They say it undermines Hong
Kong's high degree of autonomy and blurs the distinction between the two
systems. But the high degree of autonomy is defined by the Basic Law, and is
subject to the Standing Committee's power of interpretation. The exercise of
that power is a reflection of the limits of Hong Kong's high degree of
autonomy, not an erosion of it.
Moreover, the two systems are not
entirely separate. They exist within one country. The relationship between Hong
Kong and the central authorities is set out in the Basic Law - a law that
applies throughout the country. An interpretation by the Standing Committee is
the exercise of a constitutional power that was designed to ensure that the
Basic Law is correctly implemented throughout the country.
Others argue that the power of
interpretation should not have been exercised in this case, since the
provisions in question are quite clear. But the debate in Hong Kong has
revealed many areas of uncertainty. For instance, Annex I of the Basic Law
refers to the possibility of amending the method for selecting the chief
executive for the terms subsequent to the year 2007. Different views had been
expressed as to whether amendments could be made for the purposes of the
selection process in 2007. The Standing Committee's interpretation has made it
clear that, if there is a need, the process can be amended for that year.
Second, Annex II sets out how the
Legislative Council shall be formed in its first three terms. It then provides
how that Annex can be amended if there is a need to do so. What it does not
make clear is how the fourth-term Legco is to be formed if there is no need to
amend Annex II, or if no agreement can be reached on the nature of the amendment.
Some people feared there would be a vacuum, which only the NPC could fill. The
Standing Committee has now ruled that this would not be the case. If there is
no amendment, the method in the Annex that will be used this September would
continue to apply. Another objection was based on the fact that the
interpretation was initiated in Beijing, not from Hong Kong. On the only
previous occasion when the Standing Committee has issued an interpretation, it
was at the request of the chief executive - following the court's
right-of-abode ruling. At the time, critics said it was unconstitutional, but
that proved to be wrong. In the present case, critics can no longer argue this,
nor can they say the interpretation interferes with judicial independence.
Instead, they complain that it
opens the door for further interpretation. But the Standing Committee has
always had that power, and has clearly exercised self-restraint in its
exercise.
The final criticism is based on
the view that the interpretation is, in effect, an amendment to the Basic Law.
I beg to differ. The two Annexes of the Basic Law provide a mechanism by which
the methods for selecting the chief executive, and for forming Legco, can be
amended if there is a need. The Annexes do not, however, explain the procedure
for determining whether or not there is such a need. If the matter were to be
resolved judicially, the court would have to decide on the correct procedures.
According to the leading text on
statutory interpretation, such a decision involves expounding the verbal
formula of the enactment creatively, using its wording as a guide to the
imputed intention. Such creativity by a court would not be condemned as an
amendment. We should not apply double standards when the Standing Committee
takes a similar approach.
The interpretation merely
clarifies the procedures to be followed: the chief executive shall make a
report to the Standing Committee regarding whether there is a need to make an
amendment, and the Standing Committee shall make a decision in the light of
actual situation and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly
progress.
Some people claim that the
interpretation has put an end to the current debate on democratic development.
That seems unlikely. There appear to be strong aspirations for such
development. But these must be kept within the constitutional framework.
Hong Kong began its democratic
development comparatively recently. As we take it forward, we should not forget
that it has already achieved remarkable prosperity and stability, and an
enviable reputation for protecting human rights.
Gradual and orderly progress is a
formula that allows us to move forward on the firm basis of those achievements.
Robert Allcock is Hong Kong's
solicitor-general
(Published on 15 April 2004 South
China Morning Post)